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of commitments that it has already entered into. Examples include our share 
of the EU’s climate change commitments entered into in Paris, and our share of 
multiannual aid commitments to developing countries - some of which are part of 
trade deals with those countries.
At this stage, there are many more questions than answers. And the number of 
questions grows by the day. We are some way from having a complete inventory of 
the matters that will need to be settled, let alone a government negotiating objective 
on each one, or a strategy.
Ireland: borders and borderlines
Cian O’Callaghan and Mary Gilmartin
The troubled history of Derry-Londonderry is still visible in the city. A map on the 
riverside directs visitors to the Bloody Sunday Memorial and the H Block Monument, 
while the Peace Bridge, opened in 2011, physically and symbolically links the largely 
unionist ‘Waterside’ with the largely nationalist ‘Cityside’. One of the outcomes of the 
peace process has been to dismantle many of the hard borders that used to divide 
communities both within the North and between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland in the South. On an average weekend the city is filled with pedestrians 
from both sides of the border. The easy movement between these jurisdictions is 
now an everyday reality for these communities. The Peace Bridge became a focal 
point for events during the City of Culture Celebrations in 2013, the River Foyle thus 
becoming ‘a route rather than barrier - a place where events occur rather than a liminal 
space between two sides of the city’.1 On either side of the bridge there is a plaque 
recognising the support of European Regional Development Fund. It is one of many 
visible signs of EU involvement in the recent development of the city. 
The political border between the North and the South represents the most 
obvious residual impact of Ireland’s status as a post-colony; and even though 
the South has experienced considerable economic growth since the 1990s, the 
legacies of under-development are evident in a weak indigenous industry sector 
and comparatively poor (by European standards) public infrastructure and service 
provision. The economic policy developed by the Irish state over the last thirty years 
can be seen, in part, as a response to these limitations. The Irish state has positioned 
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itself as a strategic economic border between the US and Europe, seeking to attract 
US multinationals through a low corporate tax rate, an English-speaking workforce 
and the promise of access to European markets. In this capacity, it has also gained a 
reputation as a borderline tax haven. 
With Brexit, there comes the possibility that these borders will be redrawn in 
a variety of ways. Firstly, the global political upheaval of Brexit may challenge the 
already fragile political-economic trajectory of the Irish state post-crisis. Secondly, 
new regional inequalities created by the crisis may be further exacerbated, 
particularly for communities in border regions. Thirdly, Brexit has potential 
implications for migrants who have moved between Ireland and Britain, and could 
radically revise the border between the North and South. Finally, Brexit threatens to 
undermine certain advances made by the Northern Ireland peace process. 
Economic borders and the neoliberal state project
A range of possible outcomes involving the realignment of political and economic 
powers following Brexit could destabilise the South of Ireland’s position within the 
European and global economy. While initial media and political discussion on Brexit 
myopically focused on how Ireland could capitalise by luring finance and technology 
companies from London to Dublin, more serious concerns soon emerged about the 
stability of Ireland’s economic position in an EU without the UK. Towards the end of 
June 2016, the Irish government published a ‘contingency plan’ on the implications 
of Brexit for Ireland. Outlining political, economic and governance implications, the 
plan demonstrates the continued significance of the UK’s relationship to Ireland. 
Ireland’s economy is highly dependent on retaining the current geopolitical status 
quo. Its (partial and uneven) economic recovery and its position within the global 
economy are highly dependent on a specific articulation of relational geographies 
comprising the UK, the US and Europe. This means that a change of the magnitude 
of Brexit has serious implications. The loss of the UK as a strong ally could weaken 
Ireland’s position within the EU. Similarly, Britain leaving the EU common market 
could negatively impact on Ireland’s economy, in that the UK remains the country’s 
largest trading partner. A report published in November by the Irish Department 
of Finance suggested that Brexit could cause ‘negative consequences for [Ireland’s] 
employment, wages and the public finances lasting for at least 10 years’, and shrink 
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the Irish economy by 4 per cent.2 
Ireland’s precarious position is not simply fiscal, however, but relates more 
fundamentally to the way the Irish state positions itself within the global economy. 
This can be seen in the recent controversy over the EU’s ruling that Apple should 
pay Ireland €13 billion in uncollected tax revenue, and the decision by the Fine 
Gael-led minority government to appeal this ruling. Although anti-austerity parties 
have suggested that the government use the money to address homelessness and 
health-service crises, others have argued that the EU ruling signals an international 
challenge to Ireland’s position as a strategic node intersecting the US and the Europe. 
Uneven development and regional inequality
Since the crash, a new landscape of regional inequalities has emerged across the 
island of Ireland, and some of the areas most affected are those in the border regions. 
As Dave Featherstone suggested in a recent article in Soundings, this kind of 
regional inequality is a ‘product of political decisions and strategies’, in this case 
resulting from the economic trajectory of the Celtic Tiger years, which created a 
landscape of uneven development in the South.3 During the first phase of the Celtic 
Tiger expansion in the 1990s, growth was export-led, mainly due to the rapid influx 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country, primarily from US multinational 
companies. FDI was mainly clustered in urban areas, thus limiting the geographical 
spread of the benefits of the boom. Moreover, new high-tech sectors left a crucial 
employment gap for low-skilled workers. The property bubble took over as the main 
driver of economic growth during the 2000s, and temporarily staved off crisis on 
both of these fronts by spreading employment in construction. But since the bubble 
burst, the major drivers of economic recovery have been in the areas of FDI that 
were not so heavily hit by the crisis, namely the urban areas, while areas heavily 
reliant on the bubble economy of construction and consumer services have seen 
little in the way of economic rebound. Thus the crisis (and government responses to 
it) have created new regional inequalities. 
Brexit threatens to further exacerbate the situation for communities on both 
sides of the border. According to the 2011 Census, 14,800 persons regularly 
commuted between the jurisdictions for either study or work, and the numbers 
travelling for consumption or leisure are presumably much higher. And Brexit may 
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also have implications for cross-border agreements around shared services, such 
as the memorandum of understanding between Newry and Dundalk created in 
2010.4 Moreover, EU funding has been of paramount importance for investment in 
economic and social infrastructures in border communities, through organisations 
like InterTradeIreland and the Centre for Cross-Border Studies.
In regions already suffering economically and socially from the crisis, the impact 
of Brexit could put further strain on already depressed communities. 
Migration and citizenship
Brexit also has potential implications for the significant numbers of migrants 
who have moved between Ireland and Britain. In 2011 there were 112,259 UK 
nationals living in the Republic of Ireland: it was the second-largest immigrant 
group. In 2014 there were around 331,000 Irish nationals living in the UK: it 
was the third-largest immigrant group. Numbers are even higher if we consider 
country of birth. Approximately 230,000 Irish residents in 2011 were born in either 
England, Scotland or Wales, while around 383,000 UK residents in 2014 were born 
in Ireland. These figures indicate the long established free movement of people 
between Ireland and Britain. For people from Ireland in particular, Britain has long 
been a place of opportunity and escape. 
This easy mobility between Ireland and Britain has been made possible by the 
Common Travel Area, which allows free movement of citizens between the two 
states. It predates the European Union, and has existed in some form since 1922, 
when the Irish Free State was established. Since 1949, Irish citizens have not been 
considered ‘foreign’ in the UK, and UK citizens are not considered ‘non-nationals’ in 
Ireland. This means that Irish people living in Britain and people from the UK living 
in Ireland have more political, social and economic rights than other immigrants.5 
But Brexit means that all of these rights, and the right to free movement, are now 
in question. Special measures will be needed to protect both the Common Travel 
Area and the privileged status of Irish and UK nationals. Yet, there has been limited 
discussion of this issue. 
For UK voters, immigration was a key issue in the Brexit debate, and many saw 
the decision to leave the EU as a way of limiting future immigration and restricting 
the rights of immigrants. If this issue comes under scrutiny, will the special treatment 
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afforded to Irish immigrants in Britain become an easy target for anti-immigrant 
politicians and activists? And what of British immigrants in Ireland? Will there be 
the political will to protect their rights and privileges, or will these also be targeted? 
These questions have not been at the forefront of public statements about how Brexit 
will be negotiated, but they are causing ongoing anxiety for British citizens living in 
Ireland and Irish citizens living in Britain. 
Brexit has also shown us how porous these categories of national identity can 
be. People from Northern Ireland, in most instances, continue to be entitled to 
Irish citizenship. And since the Brexit vote, there has been a significant increase in 
the number of British people applying for Irish citizenship, mostly on the basis of 
having an Irish ancestor. These new citizenship formations are evidence of the links 
and connections between Ireland and Britain that - post-Brexit - continue to stretch 
across space and time. 
The peace process
The Good Friday Agreement signed on 10 April 1998 marked a major watershed 
in the long-running peace process in the North. Though it was not a panacea for 
a range of recalcitrant social and economic issues, it nevertheless improved life 
immeasurably for communities in the North. In less direct ways, the peace process 
has also been a key element of the political and economic trajectory of the South. 
Denis O’Hearn, for example, notes how the Celtic Tiger tag was ‘half jokingly’ 
assigned to Ireland in a Morgan Stanley report that coincided with the IRA cease-
fire in 1994.6 Ireland’s economic fortunes during the 1990s and 2000s were, if 
not dependent on, certainly enabled by the cessation of conflict. Moreover, key 
political figures such as former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern were centrally involved in the 
negotiations around the peace process, and it is viewed as a key component of his 
political legacy. But, in quite practical ways, Brexit threatens some of the advances 
made by the peace process.
After Brexit, the land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland will become an EU external border; and the EU and some member 
states have recently been devoting considerable resources to securitising external 
borders. Frontex, the EU’s external border agency established in 2004, has become 
more active in recent years in policing external land and sea borders. In addition, 
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individual states in the EU have been building hard borders, such as the razor 
wire fences along the Hungarian border. Given these trends, there would surely be 
pressure to securitise this new EU external border. However, there is considerable 
concern about the possibility of the re-establishment of a hard border between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. One proposal floated by the 
Conservative government in the UK has been to push Britain’s immigration controls 
back to Irish ports and airports, in lieu of re-establishing a hard border between 
the North and South. This would mean that individuals entering Ireland could be 
subject to British immigration controls. This elicited much public derision, but 
the response from the political class was not unfavourable. Enda Kenny, the Irish 
Taoiseach, has repeatedly insisted that there will not be a return to a hard border, 
because of fears for the peace process, and establishing British immigration controls 
at Irish borders was seen as one potential solution. This will need to be negotiated 
not just with the UK but also with the EU. 
Conclusion
For a number of reasons, the island of Ireland is very vulnerable to the potential 
upheavals Brexit might cause. A renegotiation of the now soft border could have 
highly problematic outcomes for the communities living on either side, while the 
withdrawal of EU funding could also seriously undermine community and social 
infrastructures. The prospect of Brexit also focuses attention on the increasingly 
precarious political-economic conjuncture in the South, and is a challenge to its 
fragile economic recovery, based as it is on the continuation of global status. The 
potential transformations wrought by Brexit have the potential to make material 
conditions worse for many sections of the population across the island. Where these 
events will lead remains to be seen.
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The Digital Divide: #PostRefRacism Versus #Gohome
Rooham Jamali
As more of us live more of our lives online, what happens there matters. Social media 
now constitute a major public space (although indeed one that is privately owned). 
This is a new digital commons, where the debate of the day is often thrashed out. All 
this was very apparent during the EU referendum campaign. Online as well as offline 
there was a very vibrant - and often quite nasty - political debate. 
The past fifteen years had already seen immigration become a concern and 
an important political issue in the United Kingdom. In 2012, about 60 per cent 
of people living in the UK viewed the rate of immigrants settling in the UK with 
disapproval, and a large majority of them wanted immigration levels to be reduced.1 
‘Migration in the News’, a report published in 2013 by the Oxford Migration 
Observatory, found that ‘illegal’ was the most common word used alongside the 
word ‘immigrant’ in mainstream print-based media.2 However, many commentators 
have argued that the EU referendum marks a new departure, and was even more 
divisive than anyone had expected. 
In this article, I take a look at some of the broad contours of the digital debate 
through looking on Twitter - which, for several reasons, is a good place to conduct 
such an analysis. Although it is by no means a representative sample of UK citizens, 
